Over all of this, a sublime group of speculative Naturphilosophen soars like an eagle. They assimilate their earthly booty into the purest ether and return it again as beautiful poetry.
See Allen
Reil's practical experience, his freethinking ways, his deep knowledge of science and philosophy, and his difficult and contrarian personality-to which his colleague Henrik Steffens would lovingly attest'5-all of this gave him a taste for revolution, at least in medicine. In 1795 he founded the journal Archivfiir die Physiologie, which became the herald of the movement he led, namely, the effort to make medicine a thoroughgoing Wissenschaft.'6 He intended physiology to serve as the scientific foun- 
Lebenskraft
In his tract, Reil accepted the epistemology of Kant's first Critique, though he rejected the regulative biology of the third. In the spirit of the former, he agreed that we had access only to phenomena, which in the external realm had to be scientifically understood in causal and spatial terms. Thus he ruled out any appeal to a soul (a la Georg Stahl) as the sort of entity that might explain fundamental operations of the body. He also thought thatJohann Friedrich Blumenbach's concept of the Bildungstrieb (formational drive) conveyed misleading implications, since Trieb suggested that some feeling or mental representation functioned in the interstices of purely material operations. Physiological processes, he maintained, were determined by "blind necessity," not by any ghostly intentions.'8 Reil did not, however, reject a mental principle tout court since he himself, at this early stage of his reflections, embraced a kind of Kantian dualism. The understanding of cognitive processes, therefore, might require principles other than those of physics and chemistry, but the construal of basic physiological activity did not. Reil insisted that he would seek "the foundation of all phenomena of animal bodies, which are not representations or not connected with representations [that is, mental operations] as cause or effect, in animal matter, in the original differences of their basic material and in the composition [Mischung] and form [Form] of that material" ("VL," p. 11). Sensibility, digestion, growth, reproduction-all the physiological operations of the body had thus to be under-
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Rhapsodies on a Cat-Piano stood purely as functions of the chemical composition and structural form of the material elements making up the animal organism. These basic material elements could also be found in nonliving bodies, though in combinations differing from those found in living ones. According to Reil, the conventional name for the property of matter that allows it to be perceived by human senses is "force [Kraft]" ("VL," p. 19). In itself, though, "force is a subjective concept, the form according to which we think the connection between cause and effect" ("VL," p. 46).19 Talk about life forces, then, ultimately referred only to the necessary causal interactions of the material elements of an organic body and their outcomes: "If it were possible for us to think clearly of each body as it is-simultaneously of the nature of its constituent elements and their connection, of their composition and form-then we would not find the concept of force necessary, a concept that produces so many erroneous conclusions" ("VL," p. 46).
Reil 23. In this early period, evolution did not refer to species change but to the embryological theory that the fetus was already a preformed adult that simply had to unfold, or "evolve," to achieve more visibly articulate form. The opposing theory of epigenesis held that the fetus developed gradually from an unformed, homogeneous mass. For a discussion of the origin of these ideas and their relation to species evolution, see Robert J. Richards Kant also maintained that we had to conceive of life as coming only from previous life, not because he thought some spark was needed but because life itself seemed the only source for an organization that elevated a creature to a higher level of being than that of a mere chemicalmechanical contrivance. He believed we properly conceived an organism as a "natural end [Naturzweck]," that is, as an individual in which each part was related to all the other parts reciprocally as means and ends, and in which the whole determined the parts and the parts the whole.24 After citing Kant's analysis of our necessary understanding of the organic, Reil dismissed it. "Indeed," he contended, "each part forms itself and maintains itself through its own energy; its connection with the other parts is only the external determination whereby its force can be effective" ("VL," p. 55). As a good physician, Reil knew that many important organs of the body could fail-for example, particular muscle groups, this or that sense organ, the higher faculties of the brain-without endangering the maintenance of the whole. Indeed, he sagely observed that "we often find in an animal one part that is principally good or bad, in opposition to the character of the other parts. With scholars, not infrequently, we find all the organs ill or failing, except the brain" ("VL," pp. 105-6). The individual parts of the body, he maintained, existed fairly independently of one another. In a metaphor that would resonate with many biologists throughout the nineteenth century, Reil likened the parts of an organic body to a republic:
The animal body is like a large republic, which consists of many parts. These parts, of course, stand in a determinate relationship with one another and they contribute to the maintenance of the whole. But each part operates through its own force and possesses its own perfections, deficiencies, and failures independently of the other branches of the body. FN, p. 253) . The entire direction of Reil's analysis implied that the powers that were called psychic could ultimately be reduced to forces of the nervous system. In this respect, his treatise on mental illness conformed closely to the principles laid down in his monograph "Von der Lebenskraft." During the year of the publication of his volume on psychiatric fevers, a new world dawned for Reil. Early in 1803 he saw through the press a most unusual work, also on the subject of mental illness, his Rhapsodieen iiber die Anwendung der psychischen Curmethode auf Geisteszerriittungen. This book differed fundamentally, however, from the just-completed fourth volume in his series on fevers.
Reil's Rhapsodieen became perhaps the most influential work in the shaping of German psychiatry before Freud. The conditions of its origin were complex, involving medical practice, philosophical reorientation, and the new cultural environment in which Reil found himself. As before, Reil's experience in treating many in his regular practice who suffered from various mental derangements, including some of his friends (for example, Goldhagen and Herz), obviously played a role.33 He also wished to contribute, as his preface made clear, to the new movement that sought a more humane and rational treatment for the insane, a movement in Halle led by his friend the preacher Heinrich Wagnitz, to whom his book was dedicated. Unlike Reil's previous work, the model of mind that he developed in the Rhapsodieen went considerably beyond Kantian boundaries. Quite clearly he had been reading Schelling, the young, charismatic philosopher, who at the time was a member of the romantic circle in Jena and had been causing quite an intellectual stir throughout the Germanies. Schelling's romantic idealism, I believe, fundamentally reoriented Reil's understanding of the root causes of mental illness. In the light of this new philosophical conception, Reil came to regard insanity as stemming from the fragmentation of the self, from an incomplete or misformed personality, and from the inability of the self to construct a 33. It seems a historiographic commonplace that Reil actually had little experience with mentally ill patients. In his Rhapsodieen, Reil specifically recounted the case of his beloved teacher Goldhagen, who, at the end of his life, would wander through his own house to find the sick person, only to realize finally that he was searching for himself; he also described the problems of Herz, who suffered from delusions about his location during his illness (see RU, pp. 70 and 86). In the Rhapsodieen Reil referred to other patients who had comparable ailments. His good friend Henrik Steffens, who would have known, pointedly declared that Reil "was a very successful psychiatric [psychischer] physican, and many who suffered from obvious madness were restored by him" (Steffens,Johann Christian Reil, p. 48).
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RobertJ. Richards coherent world of the nonego-all of which resulted from the malfunctioning of self-consciousness, that fundamentally creative activity of mind postulated by the romantic philosophers.
Though various particular events could precipitate a breakdown in the self, the undeniable progressive advantages of civilization, Reil thought, inevitably had their dark side. The pressures of advancing culture could as well fracture the integrity of the self. In the Rhapsodieen, he sharply diagnosed civilization and its discontents: Nature has endowed us with so many divine impulses toward lofty and noble deeds; the drive for fame, for one's own perfection; the power of self-determination and rule; and the passions, which through their storms guard against the deadly desire for sleep. Yet nature, through these very same inclinations, has also planted in us as many seeds for madness [Narrheit] . By equally measured step, as we advance on the path of our sensible and intellectual culture, we fall back ever nearer to the madhouse. [RU, p. 12]34
Thus the same powers of nature that lead us to construct a shining city on a hill can also shatter the self that mirrors the world, so that the city might be duplicated in a frenzy of distorted images. That, at least, is the metaphor with which Reil dramatically opened his volume:
It is a remarkable experience to step from the whirl of a large city into its madhouse. One finds here repeated the same scenes, though as in a vaudeville performance; yet, in this fool's system there exists a kind of easy genius in the whole. The madhouse has its usurpers, tyrants, slaves, criminals, and defenseless martyrs, fools who laugh without cause and fools who torture themselves without cause. In the Rhapsodieen, Reil again proposed a medical and quasiphysiological interpretation of mind, identifying mental powers quite closely with underlying forces of the brain and nervous system.35 In "Von der Lebenskraft," Reil had argued that, like a republic, the forces that held an organism together arose from its constituent citizen-elements. Now, however, he represented the nervous system as imperial, a kind of Napoleon that instituted a dynamic ordering for the various lower centers of force. But this Napoleon came up from the people, as it were; that is, the forces expressed at lower levels of interaction gave rise to yet higher syntheses, to transmutations of organization and powers. This 
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Spring 1998 717 in the nervous system.38 Hence, an altered mind was an altered brain. This practical identity justified, to some extent anyway, his use of a mixed mental and physical vocabulary-though even today, it is hardly the style of medical writers to avoid scrupulously verbal and conceptual promiscuity when discussing the operations of the brain or mind. The close identification of brain and mind would have been more offensive had Reil retained Kantian ties. But his mental model, launched just the year before in his volume on fevers, slipped its Kantian moorings and sailed away on currents flowing directly from idealist philosophy.
In the Rhapsodieen, Reil distinguished three chief forces of the soul, whose disruption could produce pathology. These were self-consciousness (Selbstbewusstsein), prudential awareness (Besonnenheit), and attention (Aufmerksamkeit). Though he had mentioned the latter two powers in his earlier work on mental illness, he devoted most of his effort in the Rhapsodieen to the analysis of a force now considered the most crucial for understanding pathologies, that of self-consciousness and its attendant powers of temporal and spatial perception.
Reil conceived of self-consciousness as a distinctively active force, much in the manner of Schelling, who, unlike Kant, made self-consciousness do real work in the construction of the self and its world.39 "The essence of self-consciousness," Reil held, "seems chiefly to consist in joining the manifold into unity and assimilating the representations as one's own" (RU, p. 54). Self-consciousness wove together disparate representations (Vorstellungen) into a coherent whole and constituted them as ours. Without this force each of us would become "an empty likeness in the mirror of a sea that simply reflects floating objects but cannot hold fast to the received images, cannot make them one's property" (RU, pp. 53-54). Moreover, without self-consciousness we would lack personality; our history would remain disconnected, scattered shards without solidifying temporal relationships. Self-consciousness "synthesizes the mental Reil thought there were enough madmen in France after the revolution to supply Pinel with sufficient cases for an extensive study, but he judged the Frenchman's work, while "excellent in particular parts, ill in systematic treatment, and without principles or originality" (RU, p. 31). Reil, one of the most famously accomplished men of his profession, may have been negatively reacting to what Jan Goldstein calls the "populist" character of Pinel's treatment regimens-that is, his borrowing of methods from nonprofessional empirics and "quacks," who nonetheless had some success in treating the insane.42 One might suspect, though, that these more superficial differences between Pinel and Reil disguised a deeper unity of conception, since, after all, they both advocated a kind of psychological therapy. But as one descends to more profound levels, the rifts appear even larger. Pinel had cast his notions about therapy into a Condillacian sensationalism, which supposed that ideas streamed rather directly from the empirical world into the mind; madness, according to this interpretation, resulted from the improper arrangement and ordering of those ideas. Reil, by contrast, assumed, in his Schellingian way, that consciousness created both the self and the world whence ideas supposedly came. Madness stemmed not from a lack of logic in the ordering of ideas; rather, it flowed in broken rivulets through the cracks of a fragmented personality. Pinel's diagnostic categories-melancholia, mania without delirium, mania with delirium, dementia, and idiotism-were quite general and depended on the kinds of symptoms displayed. Reil's categories were more refined and were based on the faculties of mind 
